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AMENDED RULE 8(b) STATEMENT
In March 1984 plaintiff filed suit in District of Columbia
Superior Court under the D.C. Human Rights Act, 1 D.C. Code 2501
et seq., making allegations similar to those in the present case.
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, No. 3469-84. Plaintiff's original
complaint in the present case in September 1984 also contained a
count asserting a violation of the D.C. Human Rights Act. In
February 1985 the district court approved a stipulation
dismissing this count without prejudice to plaintiff's right to
pursue such a claim in Superior Court. Proceedings in Superior
Court have been stayed pending resolution of this case.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
1. Whether the district court's finding that discrimination
tainted Price Waterhouse's refusal to admit Ann Hopkins to
partnership was clearly erroneous.
2. Whether the district court's finding that Price
Waterhouse had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that
Hopkins would have been denied admission in the absence of
discrimination was clearly erroneous.
-v-
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT-CROSS APPELLEE
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Price Waterhouse seeks to overturn the district court's
finding that the firm excluded Ann Hopkins from partnership
because of her sex. Defendant argues alternatively that Hopkins
is not entitled to relief, even assuming discrimination. Both
arguments suffer from the same infirmities: the unwillingness to
acknowledge undisputed facts and to come to grips with
established law. Thus Price Waterhouse ignores the voluminous
record evidence showing that plaintiff suffered discrimination
because of her sex and tries to bury one of the most damning
pieces of evidence   her boss' advice, after she was first
rejected for partnership, that she "walk more femininely, tal 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her
hair styled, and wear jewelry." Similarly, defendant's argument
that plaintiff's departure from the firm was a voluntary
resignation, foreclosing relief, is premised on the notion that
she retained a significant opportunity to become a partner. Here
defendant ignores both the facts and the district court's
contrary finding.
On the legal side, Price Waterhouse writes 58 pages, most of
which are devoted to urging reversal of the lower court's finding
of discrimination, without once mentioning Rule 52 or the Supre e
Court's decision in Anderson v. Bessemer City,   U.S.  , 105
S.Ct. 1504 (1985), holding that such findings are entitled to
great deference. It also seeks to impugn this Court's seminal
decision in Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.Cir. 1976), even
though the approach in Day has since been reaffirmed here and has
been adopted in several other Circuits. And the firm does not
appreciate the lesson of this Court's decision in Clark v. Marsh,
665 F.2d 1168 (D.C.Cir. 1981), which makes it clear that a
career-ending decision by an employer gives an employee no
reasonable choice but to leave, thus establishing constructive
discharge.
We will address the issues of liability and relief in turn
and first will discuss the evidence more fully than in our
original brief, which sketched only those facts needed to show
-2-
plaintiff's right to relief.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 2/
A. Plaintiff's Accomplishments
Plaintiff Ann Hopkins hold a B.A. and an M.S. in
mathematics. She is married and has three children. Hopkins
joined Price Waterhouse as a manager in August 1978 and was
assigned to the Office of Government Services in Washington,
D.C. She specialized in the preparation of proposals for the
design and implementation of large scale, computer based
information systems for government agencies, and she managed the
resulting contracts if the proposals were accepted.
Plaintiff proved outstanding at both developing and managing
business for Price Waterhouse. For example, in early 1980 she
prepared the firm's proposal for the first phase of a project at
the Department of State, in which State's ultimate objective was
to secure the design and implementation of a world-wide
computerized system for handling all the Department's financial
transactions. Twelve firms submitted proposals, and two   Price
Waterhouse and another   were selected for a "fly-off" in which
State required both to meet specific objectives and to prepare
more detailed proposals. Hopkins managed the PW entry in the
fly-off, which began in May 1980 and lasted until February 1982,
2/ We believe that the facts set forth herein are not disputed. For
that reason, we generally include citations only when quoting the district
court's opinion (or other matters in the Record Excerpts (RE)) or the trial
transcript (Tr.). References to plaintiff's exhibits (Pi. Ex.) are also
sometimes included.
-3-
when State declared Price Waterhouse the  inner. The resulting
contract is still in effect, and its value to the firm was
originally estimated at $25 million by Thomas Beyer, the partner-
in-charge of plaintiff's office; Beyer later increased this
estimate to $35 million. Moreover, Jose h Connor, the firm's
Senior Partner and Chairman of its Policy Board, testified that
the contract with State served as a "leading credential" enabling
2/
P  to obtain similar business from other Federal agencies.
Shortly after this contract award, the Department asked
Price Waterhouse to submit a separate proposal for a computerized
system for handling the agency's real property world-wide. State
expressly requested that plaintiff prepare the proposal and
manage the project. This second contract was awarded in the
summer of 1982; performance began in October 1982, and Hop ins
managed the project for Price Waterhouse from that time until she
left the firm in January 1984. This contract was valued at about
$6 million.
In July and August 1982   i.e., in the period between the
two State Department contracts   plaintiff was detailed for four
weeks to her firm's St. Louis office, where she supervised the
preparation of a competitive proposal to the Farmers Ho e
Administration for the design and implementation of a
computerized system for monitoring loans to farmers. This
contract, valued at over $3 million, was awarded to PW in late
1982, following a competition in which another bidder was
y J. Connor deposition at 24. (Connor's videotaped deposition was used
in lieu of his live testi ony at trial.)
-4-
initially seen as having the inside track. At the time of the
award, Thomas Beyer wrote to Joseph Connor that " nn Hopkins has
done it again!" (Pi. Ex. 14.)
B. Plaintiff's Candidacy
As noted in our original brief, plaintiff came to Price
Waterhouse in the first place because of her interest in
ultimately becoming a partner. Early on, after being told that
she was not eligible for partnership because her husband was a
partner in another large firm, she threatened to resign and
stayed on only after Price Waterhouse relented and determined
that she was eligible. - /
Candidates for partnership at Price Waterhouse are nominated
by their local offices, commented on by any of the 650 partners
who care to comment, then screened by the Admissions Committee,
an arm of the go erning Policy Board, which makes the "yes," "no"
or "hold" decision on each candidate. Plaintiff's office
initiated the admissions process for her by nominating her for
partnership in August 1982. A glowing appraisal accompanied the
nomination:
Ann Hopkins performed virtually at the
partner level for the U.S. State
Department. While many partners were
"involved" with the client. State Department
officials viewed Ann as the project manager,
supervising twenty staff and ten client
personnel. This was a difficult job  
highly competitive, demanding delivery
schedules, and a volatile client.
. / See Original Brief for Appellant-Cross Appellee at 3-4.
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* * *
. . . with the deft touch of an outstanding
professional, Ann delivered our detailed
approach to, and qualifications for, the
implementation of the [Department of State
project] in embassies and posts throughout
the world. It was an outstanding performance
and the State Department agreed as they
awarded the $25 million project to our firm.
* * *
In her five years with the firm, she has
demonstrated conclusively that she has the
capacity and capability to contribute
significantly to the growth and profitability
of the firm. Her strong character,
independence and integrity are well
recognized by her clients and peers. Ms.
Hopkins has outstanding oral and written
communication s ills. She has a good
business sense, an ability to grasp and
handle quickly the most complex issues, and
strong leadership qualities.
(PI. Ex. 15; emphasis in original.)
Price Waterhouse sets no limit on the number of candidates
who can be nominated or admitted each year, and in the fall of
1982 88 candidates were nominated   87  en and plaintiff. As in
most firms, business generation is prized at PW, and plaintiff
brought in more business than any of the 87 men who were
considered for partnership along with her. As the district court
found, "[n]one of the other partnership candidates at Price
Waterhouse that year had a comparable record in terms of
successfully securing major contracts for the partnership."
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.D.C. 1985)
(RE 11). In addition, she billed more hours than any of the men
under consideration.
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The court also found that Hopkins' "clients appear to have
been very pleased with her work." _Id. If anything, this was an
understatement. At trial, two high Department of State officials
both at the Assistant Secretary level   testified for
plaintiff. The Comptroller of the Department called her
performance "excellent" and said that she was "extremely
competent, intelligent ... strong and forthright, very
productive, energetic and creative"   and that she also had a
sense of humor (Tr. 148, 150). The Assistant Secretary for
Administration and Security agreed and said that he particularly
valued Hopkins' "intellectual clarity"; he also said that he had
tried to hire her to work at State (Tr. 156-157).
Despite her outstanding record, plaintiff was not admitted
to the partnership after her office nominated her. Instead, the
Policy Board placed her on "hold." There was no question  
indeed. Price Waterhouse conceded   that Hopkins met all
objective standards for partnership. But several of the partners
who submitted evaluations criticized her "interpersonal skills"
and voted against her admission. As the lower court found, most
of these were "short form" comments from partners who had
"limited contact" with her. 618 F.Supp. at 1113 (RE 12).
Nevertheless, these comments and negative votes were
"determinative" in the Admissions Committee's recommendation that
plaintiff be placed on hold, and in the Policy Board's adoption
of that recommendation,  d* As Joseph Connor, the Chairman of
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the Policy Board, put it, "those who had less than full time
involvement with Ann, were in effect the deciders on this one."  
Of the 88 candidates nominated when plaintiff was in August
1982, 47 were admitted to partnership, 21 were rejected, and 20
including plaintiff   were placed on hold. Seventeen of the
19 men on hold were renominated in August 1983 (the only
exceptions were two two-year holds), and 15 were admitted to
partnership. Plaintiff, however, was not renominated. Instead,
she was advised that it was "very unlikely" that she would ever
become a partner. 618 F.Supp. at 1113 (RE 12). She was told
that she could remain as a manager (PW's equivalent of an
associate in a law firm), but a senior partner in her office
advised her to resign. This partner, Donald Epelbaum, was one of
two from her office who now opposed her candidacy, so his advice
was especially telling. In any event, the regular practice at
the firm is for candidates rejected for partnership to resign,
and plaintiff left Price Waterhouse in January 1984 and set up
her own consulting firm.
C. "Interpersonal S ills" at Price Waterhouse
Partners at Price Waterhouse frequently comment on the
personal characteristics of candidates for partnership. But the
negative comments about plaintiff quite clearly were overblown.
Three high level professionals who had worked for plaintiff   a
man and two women   testified on her behalf. They each said
/ J. Connor deposition at 62.
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that she was demanding but that she was fair. They each praised
her and said that they would like to work with her again ( r.
417-440).
Hopkins also dealt fairly and effectively with low level
staff. In the autumn of 1982  she was assigned responsibility
for managing the Word Processing Department in her office, an
assignment that had previously been handled by partners. Thomas
Beyer, the partner-in-charge of her office, testified that
plaintiff performed better in this role than the two partners who
preceded her. He agreed that this was because "she addressed the
personal problems of people on the staff," and that it was "one
of the first times [he] had seen someone at that level, partner
or manager ... get involved with the people themselves" (Tr. 208-
211) .
Not only were the criticisms of plaintiff's "interpersonal
skills" overstated, such criticisms were not fatal for otherwise
qualified male candidates. For example, in 1982 the Policy Board
considered a man who conveyed the image of a "Marine drill
sergeant" and who was said to be "crude, crass, etc." Joseph
Connor acknowledged that the candidate's manner and style
presented serious problems. Yet a member of the Policy Board
defended the candidate, saying that "He is a man's man; he is
very direct," and the Board decided to admit him (Pi. Ex. 20).
A year later, at the same time that the Policy Board
accepted the recommendation of its Admissions Committee and
placed plaintiff on hold, the Board overrode the Committee and
admitted four men for whom hold status had also been
-9
recommended. Among these was a candidate whose technical skills
and business development efforts had been praised by the
Committee, but about whom the Committee said:
[He] is aggressive and self confident. It is
apparent that he has, at times, carried these
traits to excess with the result that a
number of partners comment on him in such
terms as "lac ing maturity," "wise-guy
attitude," "headstrong," "abrasive and
overbearing" and "cocky." The [office]
partners rate him relatively low in the
managerial skills and personal attributes
categories as a result of these traits.
(Pi. Ex. 25.) Despite the Committee's comments, which were much
harsher than anything the Committee said about plantiff, the
Policy Board rejected the "hold" recommendation and decided to
admit the candidate.
nother candidate in 1983 had received "negative comments"
for "stubbornness and inflexibility," but the Policy Board
decided to admit him, noting that "[h]e does excellent work in
bringing in work" (Pi. Ex. 20). Similarly, in 1984 the Board
discussed the "great [number of] no's" for a candidate, and it
was said that these stemmed from his making a "weak first
impression." A Board member defended the candidate, however,
saying that "in areas in which he is working they want results
and are not concerned abt. 1st impressions." The Board admitted
him (Id.).
There is frequently no record of the nature of the
deliberations on candidates for whom the Admissions Committee
makes a favorable recommendation to the Policy Board, since the
Committee does not submit documentation in such cases. For this
reason, it is not possible to identify all the men at Price
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Waterhouse who have become partners despite concerns about their
interpersonal skills. But when asked whether such men exist, the
Chairman of the Admission Committee responded, "Oh, yes" (Tr.
292) .
Concerns about personality were not harmful to otherwise
qualified male candidates for partnership, but any such
criticisms invariably proved fatal to the chances of the few
women who were nominated in the years preceding plaintiff's
candidacy. As the court below found, "[b]esides the plaintiff,
the Admissions Committee rejected at least two other women
candidates because partners believed that they were curt, brusque
and abrasive, acted like 'Ma Barker' or tried to be 'one of the
boys'." 618 F.Supp. at 111? (RE 23). It is also instructive
that the Policy Board, in placing plaintiff on hold, said that
she had a "lot of talent" but needed "social grace" (Pi. Ex. 20).
D. The Advice Given Plaintiff
After the Policy Board put plaintiff on hold in the spring
of 1983, she consulted with  homas Beyer, the partner-in-charge
of her office and a strong supporter. As the district court
found, Beyer was "responsible for telling her what problems the
Policy Board had identified with her candidacy." 618 F.Supp. at
1117 (RE 22). Price Waterhouse tries to challenge this finding,
but a member of the Policy Board, who had been charged with
investigating plaintiff's candidacy, testified that "I would ha e
no doubt that Tom Beyer would be the one that would have to tal 
with her. He knew exactly where the problems were" (Tr. 316).
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And it is undisputed   and the court below found   that Beyer
advised plaintiff to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and
wear jewelry." 618 F.Supp. at 1117 (RE 22).
Shortly thereafter, Joseph Connor advised Hopkins to go on a
Quality Control Review (a vehicle for exposing potential
candidates to partners in other offices), and "[s]everal partners
indicated that they planned to give the plaintiff opportunities
to demonstrate her abilities and receive more exposure." _Id. at
1113 (RE 12). But "these partners never followed through on
their plans," _Id_., and the "favorable results" that Hopkins got
on her Quality Control Review proved moot, since her office
decided not to nominate her again. _Id. This was because two of
the partners in her office, including Donald Epelbaum, now
opposed her candidacy.
Managers at Price Waterhouse can be and are nominated for
partnership without unanimous support within their home offices
(for example, a successful male candidate from St. Louis had been
opposed by at least three of the partners in his office) (Pi. Ex.
20). Given the criticisms that had been leveled at plaintiff,
however, the partners felt that something approaching unanimity
was needed to renominate her, because "[w]ithout strong support
within [her] office, it was felt that her candidacy could not
possibly be successful." 618 F.Supp. at 1113 (RE 12.). In these
circumstances, the opposition of two partners effectively vetoed
her renomination.
-12-
E. The District Court's Decision on Liability
In it opinion, the district court first observed that "Price
Waterhouse has conceded that plaintiff was qualified to be
considered for partnership" and that there was "no dispute" that
she had made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Id.
(RE 13). Hence the issue of liability was confined to analysis
of the firm's articulated reason for rejecting plaintiff:
asserted deficiencies in her "interpersonal skills." In this
regard, the court separately considered three arguments made by
plaintiff, although it called them "closely interrelated." Id.
at 1114 (RE 14).
The court did not find that concerns about plaintiff's
interpersonal skills were entirely groundless (or that the two
partners in her office who blocked her renomination after she was
first passed o er were themselves motivated by discriminatory
animus). Nor did the court believe that plaintiff showed that
the Policy Board engaged in disparate treatment by weighing the
comments about her personality more heavily than was true for
similarly situated men.   
/ The court also found that plaintiff's statistical proof, which was
severely constrained by the small number of women who have ever been in a
position to be considered for partnership at Price Waterhouse, was
inconclusive. This ignored the undisputed testimony of plaintiff's
statistical expert on one key point. Recognizing (as the court observed) that
"the present pool of partners have been selected over a long span of years
during which the pool of available qualified  omen has changed," 618 F.Supp.
at 1116 (RE 20), plaintiff's expert testified without contradiction that  
assuming the availability of  omen for hire and eventual consideration as
partner over time was as low as two per cent   it is statistically unlikely
that the result of 7 women of 662 partners occurred by chance (Tr. 467-468).
Defendant presented no evidence to show that the actual availability of  omen
was ever lower than two per cent.
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But the court accepted plaintiff's most powerful argument:
"that she was not evaluated as a manager, but as a woman manager,
based on a sexual stereotype that prompts [some] males to regard
assertive behavior in wo en as being more offensive and
intolerable than comparable behavior in men because some men do
not regard it as appropriate 'feminine' behavior." J[c . at 1116
(RE 21). This argument was grounded on an intensive examination
of myriad documents related to the ad issions process  
including candidate evaluations tendered by individual partners
and was supported by the testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a
social psychologist whom the court below accepted as a "well
qualified expert." JEd. at 1117 (RE 23). As the court found.
Dr. Fiske testified that situations, like
that at Price Waterhouse, in which men
evaluate women based on limited contact with
the individual in a traditionally male
profession and a male working environment
foster stereotyping. One common form of
stereotyping is that wo en engaged in
assertive behavior are judged more critically
because aggressive conduct is viewed as a
masculine characteristic.
Id. at 1118 (RE 24).
In particular, Dr. Fiske testified that behavior seen as
"outspoken" or "independent" by plaintiff's supporters became
"overbearing" or "abrasive" when viewed by her opponents: "I see
a very striking contrast in the way the same behavior gets
framed" (Tr. 591). She also pointed out that the view of a
forceful wo an as abrasive is consistent with attitudes grounded
on stereotypes.
Dr. Fiske documented her testimony with numerous references
to comments about Hopkins' candidacy from both opponents and
_14_
supporters. Many of these are recounted by the district court,
which also found that plaintiff's "[s]upporters indicated that
her critics judged her harshly due to her sex." 618 F.Supp. at
1117 (RE 21).
The problem of sex stereotyping in the Price Waterhouse
partnership selection process was especially pronounced in the
decision concerning Ann Hopkins' candidacy, but the phenomenon
arose earlier. As noted above, other women had been rejected on
similar grounds; indeed, the court found that one partner had
"repeatedly commented that he could not consider any woman
seriously as a partnership candidate and believed that women were
not even capable of functioning as senior managers   yet the
firm took no action to discourage his comments."  <3. (RE 22).
The trial court rejected the notion that Price Waterhouse
could disclaim responsibility for the sex discrimination in its
partnership admissions process. On the contrary, the court found
that "the maintenance of a system that gave weight to such biased
criticisms was a conscious act of the partnership as a whole,"
Id. at 1119 (RE 28), that the firm "should have been aware" of
the problem, _Id., and that:
Comments influenced by sex stereotypes were
made by partners; the firm's evaluation
process gave substantial weight to these
comments; and the partnership failed to
address the conspicuous problem of
stereotyping in partnership evaluations.
Id. at 1120 (RE 30).
In light of all the evidence, the court found that "the
Policy Board's decison not to admit the plaintiff to partnership
was tainted by discriminatory evaluations that were the direct
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result of its failure to address the evident problem of sexual
stereotyping in partners' evaluations." _Id. Having found that
discrimination contributed to plaintiff's rejection, the court
then placed the burden on Price Waterhouse to prove that she
would not have been admitted even in a bias-free system. See Day
v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083 (D.C.Cir. 1976). The court found that
the firm had not met this burden. _I<3. (RE 31) .
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
FOUND THAT PRICE WATERHOUSE
WAS GUILTY OF DISCRIMINATION
Consideration of the trial court's finding of discrimination
begins with Rule 52:
If the district court's account of the
evidence is plausible in li ht of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals
may not reverse it even though convinced that
had it been sitting as the trier of fact it
would have weighed the evidence
differently. Where there are two permissible
views of the evidence, the factfinder's
choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1512 (emphasis
supplied). Here the district court's finding of discrimination
certainly is "plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety," so there is no basis for reversal. See also Bishopp
v. District of Columbia, No. 85-5329 (D.C.Cir. April 18, 1986)
(slip op. at 9) (a district court's finding in a Title VII case
may be reversed only if "it is based on an utterly implausible
account of the evidence" and "it is the rare case that should be
reversed under this very restricted scope of review").
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A. The Weighty Support for the District Court's
Findin  of Discrimination
As noted in our original brief, this was a novel suit in
certain respects. It was the first case to contest a partnership
refusal on the merits and the first to confront a broadly
collegial mode of decision-making. In addition, the case was
unusual   if not unique   because there was not a fixed number
of vacancies being filled, so candidates for partnership were not
directly competing with one another.
In the typical case alleging discrimination in advancement
under Title VII   even at a high government or corporate level
there is only one vacancy being filled (or at most a
handful). The candidates for the vacancy are in direct
competition with each other, the selection is made by a single
higher level official (or a small group), and frequently the
pivotal evidence in the case is a comparison of the
qualifications of the individual selected and those of the
rejected candidate who is charging discrimination. This is this
type of situation that is particularly amenable to analysis under
the disparate treatment framework extablished by the Supreme
Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248 (1981).
In the present case, in contrast, it was less meaningful to
undertake a detailed comparison of candidates' qualifications.
The issue was not why Ann Hopkins was not admitted to partnership
instead of a particular male candidate, but rather why she was
not admitted at all.
In brief, the court found that what really happened to
-17-
plaintiff was that some men criticized her for assertive beha ior
and similar traits that they would not have found offensive in a
man, and "that the firm's evaluation process ga e substantial
weight" to these negative  iews. 618 F.Supp. at 1120 (RE 30).
Thus it is evident that discrimination infected the decision to
exclude plaintiff from partnership.
The decision on plaintiff's candidacy was made collectively,
and a large number of men had a hand in it. Even so, fewer than
5 per cent of Price Waterhouse's partners commented on plaintiff,
and it was the negative comments of fewer than 10 partners that
blocked her admission. It is thus fair to characterize the
firm's admissions process as a "modified blac ball system."
Nevertheless, defendant tried to exploit the collective nature of
the process by arguing that the decision to exclude plaintiff
could not be pinned on any particular man. The court below
properly rejected this attempt to shirk responsibility, finding
that the firm "should have been aware" of the proclivity for
discrimination in its admissions process and that "the
maintenance of a system that gave weight to ... biased criticisms
was a conscious act of the partnership as a whole." _Id. at 1119
(RE 28) .
Price Waterhouse paints a picture of a district judge off on
a flight of fantasy, anxious to craft a novel theory of
discrimination and oblivious to the absence of factual
moorings. There is fantasy here all right, but it is the firm's,
not the court's. The district court ruled from solid legal
ground, merely adapting settled principles to the relatively
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uncommon phenomenon of collegial decision-ma ing.
Defendant seems to suggest that the trial court's acceptance
of one of plaintiff's theories means that the facts underlying
the others may not be considered in addressing the issue of
discrimination. It is plain, though, that the court saw this
other ise, because it recognized that all of plaintiff's
arguments were  closely interrelated." _Id  at 1114 (RE 14). And
consideration of the entire record is required, since the Supreme
Court has ruled that "plaintiffs should be given the full benefit
of their proof without tightly compartmentalizing the  arious
factual components and wiping the slate clean after scrutiny of
each." Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
699 (1962). See also Griffin v. City of Omaha,   F. 2d.  ,
40 FEP Cases 385, 391 (8th Cir. 1986). Moreover, Anderson v.
Bessemer City requires that the district court's findings of
discrimination be considered "in light of the record viewed in
its entirety." 105 S.Ct. at 1512 (emphasis supplied).
When the entire record is viewed, it is evident that, if
anything, the district court was kind to Price Waterhouse. This
record would have supported much harsher findings and is
certainly sufficient to support the court's ultimate finding that
plaintiff's rejection was "tainted by discriminatory evaluations
that were the direct result of [the firm's] failure to address
the evident problem of sexual stereotyping in partners'
evaluations." 618 F.Supp. at 1120 (RE 30). Anderson v. Bessemer
City, supra.   
If there were nothing else, Thomas Beyer's advice to
plaintiff to behave " ore femininely" if she wanted to be a
partner is itself enough to sustain a finding of
discrimination. But   as the statement of facts above shows  
there is much more, including the trial court's telling
observation that plaintiff's "[s]upporters indicated that her
critics judged her harshly due to her sex." 618 F.Supp. at 1117
(RE 21) . -2/
ithout even paying lip service to Rule 52 or Anderson v.
Bessemer City, defendant tries to rewrite the factual record
found by the district court. Hence Price Waterhouse denigrates
the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Susan Fiske, even though
that testimony was based on the record and accepted by the
court. Moreover, Dr. Fiske was careful with her conclusions; she
did not claim to be able to say  ore than the evidence
In a note, the court framed its ultimate finding in similar fashion:
"the employer maintained a subjective evaluation process which, based on the
proof presented in the canments on the plaintiff, resulted in plaintiff's
evaluation being tainted by a discriminatory bias." 618 F.Supp. at 1120 n.16
(RE 30).
2/ There is no question that the court properly accorded heightened
scrutiny to the subjective reason given by defendant for rejecting a wo an
with outstanding credentials. See Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 965
(D.C.Cir. 1979) (subjective procedures "must be closely scrutinized because of
their capacity for masking unlawful bias"); Robinson v. Union Carbide Corp.,
538 F.2d 652, 662 (5th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977) ("high
level subjectivity subjects the ultimate promotion decision to the intolerable
occurrence of conscious or unconscious prejudice"); Stall orth v. Shuler, 777
F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1985) (process which includes "personnel choices
heavily influenced by subjective factors" may be a "tool for ...
discrimination"). See also Bishopp v. District of Columbia, supra (slip op.
at 11) ("a defendant's reliance on subjective as opposed to objective factors
requires a court to employ heightened scrutiny").
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permitted. For example, she did not purport to be able to
specify the precise degree to which sex stereotyping had
negatively affected plaintiff's candidacy. But she firmly
concluded that this was an important factor in plaintiff's
rejection, and the district court agreed.  /
Defendant also strains to discredit plaintiff's sup orting
evidence, suggesting for example that there really was not any
concern about profanity, despite a Policy Board member's
testimony that "several other partners that I spoke with had
brought up [plaintiff's] use of profanity, so that was one of the
negatives" (Tr. 321);    that the references to  charm school" or
"Ma Barker" or "one of the boys" were not sex linked; or that
Thomas Beyer's advice to plaintiff to act "femininely" was
somehow "mischaracterized." (See generally Brief for Appellee-
Cross Appellant at 13-17, 34-35.) In fact, as we have shown,
Beyer was reflecting the Policy Board's concerns: "I would have
no doubt that Tom Beyer would be the one that would have to talk
with her," testified the Board member charged with investigating
plaintiff's candidacy. "He knew exactly where the problems were"
(Tr. 316).
Defendant suggests in a footnote (n.4 in its brief) that the district
court improperly admitted Dr. Fiske's testi ony. The trial judge ruled
otherwise   "it would seem to me entirely appropriate at this stage to
examine [Price Waterhouse's] defense in the light of the expert testimony of
this witness" (Tr. 540)   and there was no abuse of discretion here. On the
contrary, the judge was clearly correct; where a defense is based on asserted
perceived deficiencies in interpersonal skills, it is reasonable to inquire
whether the perceptions themselves result from prejudice.
-5/ The same partner testified that plaintiff was not a "dirty  outh,"
although men with "dirty mouths" had been admitted (Tr. 322).
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Defendant seems to argue that intentional discrimination
cannot be found if the bias of partners who rated plaintiff was
unconscious and not subject to precise calibration. Individual
partners are not defendants here, however; Price Waterhouse is.
Whether or not individual partners were aware of their own bias,
the firm was or should have been. The district court found this,
and weighty evidence supports the finding. No more is needed to
establish the existence of actionable discrimination.
This is hardly a novel point. In sexual harassment cases,
for example, the argument today is whether an employer may be
held liable even where it had no reason to know of the
harassment. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C.Cir.
1985), cert, granted, 106 S.Ct. 57 (1985). But where an employer
is or should be on notice, there is no question that liability
attaches. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C.Cir. 1981).
The same principle applies here.
Similarly, liability is not defeated simply because the
quantum of discrimination is not susceptible to precise
measurement. In cases of sexual (or racial) harassment, the
question is simply whether the challenged action is an isolated
event or part of a more pervasive pattern. See Carter v. Duncan-
Huggins, Ltd., 727 F.2d 1225, 1236 (D.C.Cir. 1984). And here
again a key question is whether the employer is or should be
aware of the problem. _Id. In the present case, the district
court found that the problem of sex stereotyping was pervasive,
that it adversely affected Ann Hopkins' candidacy, and that Price
Waterhouse should have been aware of this. Under established
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law, no more is needed for a finding of discrimination.
Finally, the district court's opinion is especially valuable
for its recognition that discrimination may be subtle as  ell as
crass. Indeed, that is likely to be the pattern in the academic
or professional milieu. Subtle forms of discrimination are
especially insidious; as this case shows, they can produce
results that are e ery bit as harsh as any stemming from more
flagrant bias, but they are harder to detect. For this reason,
it is especially important that amply supported findings of such
discrimination be upheld, so that employers will understand that
they cannot ta e refuge in subtlety if bias is present. In this
connection, the Ninth Circuit has noted that:
The history of our nation reflects the
evolution of our understanding of the nature
of man (in the generic sense of the word) and
the legitimate aspirations and the rights of
the individual. Attitudes which seemed
benign at one time are now understood to be
discriminatory. ***  he beliefs that women
should not have the right to vote, practice
law, or serve on the United States Supreme
Court, were once reflective of majority view,
and the law. We now understand, somewhat
belatedly, that these concepts reflect a
discriminatory attitude. Today any person is
free to hold to such concepts, but such
concepts may not serve as the basis for job-
related decisions in employment covered by
Title VII. Other concepts reflect a
discriminatory attitude more subtly; the
subtlety does not, however, make the impact
less significant or less unlawful. It serves
only to make the courts' task of scrutinizing
attitudes and motivations, in order to
determine the true reason for employment
decisions, more exacting.
Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 656 F.2d 1337,
1343 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 823 (1982)
(citations omitted).
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B. The Propriety of Employin  Day v. Mathews
As we have pointed out, the decision to reject plaintiff for
partnership was collegial in nature, and this had another
important implication. Given the number of actors involved, it
was impossible to say with certainty that discrimination was the
only factor that played a role in plaintiff's rejection. Indeed,
the court below observed in dictum that it could not say in the
first instance that plaintiff would have been selected in the
absence of bias. 618 F.Supp. at 1120 (RE 31). But the court
then went on to frame the proper legal analysis.
Plaintiff proved that discrimination had infected Price
Waterhouse's decision to deny her partnership, and the district
court so found. Given this, the burden shifted to the firm to
show that she would have been excluded even in a bias-free
setting. And this, the court found, Price Waterhouse had not
done. Hence liability was fixed.
Both the district court's legal analysis and its factual
findings were correct. Title VII requires that a plaintiff prove
that unlawful discrimination played a role in the challenged
employment decision. But where that proof has been made and
accepted by the trier of fact, an employer may not escape
liability simply by pointing to evidence suggesting mixed
unlawful-lawful motivation. Instead the employer must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the same decision would have
been made even in the absence of discrimination. Day v. Mathews,
supra, 530 F.2d at 1085-1086; Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109,
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117 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
In Toney v. Block, 704 F.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C.Cir. 1983),
Judge Scalia explained the rationale of Day v. Mathews. Noting
first that Day "involved a situation in which the plaintiff had
established that unlawful discrimination had been applied against
him in the particular employment decision for which retroactive
relief was sou ht" (emphasis in original), Judge Scalia said
that:
We held that in such circumstances it is
unreasonable and destructive of the purposes
of Title VII to require the plaintiff to
establish in addition the difficult
hypothetical proposition that, had there been
no discrimination, the employment decision
would have been made in his favor. We chose
instead to place the burden upon the employer
to show, by "clear and convincing evidence,"
that the unlawful factor was not the
determinative one.
Id. (emphasis in original). - 5/
The situation described in Toney is precisely the situation
here. Ann Hopkins has "established that unlawful discrimination
had been applied against [her] in the particular employment
decision for which ... relief [is] sought," i.e.. Price
Waterhouse's decision to reject her for partnership. Hence this
is not a case in which there is simply some "background noise" of
discrimination, and defendant's attempt to suggest otherwise
founders on the facts and the findings. Given bias in the very
-15/ The district court explained Day in similar terms: "Where sex
discrimination is present, even if a promotion decision is a mixture of
legitimate and discriminatory considerations, uncertainties must be resolved
agaisnt the e ployer so that the remedial purposees of Title VII will not be
thwarted by saddling an individual subject to discrimination with an
impossible burden of proof." 618 F.Supp. at 1120 (HE 31).
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selection process resulting in defendant's refusal to admit
plaintiff to partnership. Day applies, and so the firm had the
burden "to show, by 'clear and convincing evidence,' that the
unlawful factor was not the deter inative one." Toney, supra.
he reasoning of Day is particularly important where
discrimination infects a collective decision, for the victim
would face an impossible burden in trying to prove that bias was
the sole motivating factor.
Price Waterhouse tries in vain to denigrate Day v. Mathews
(Brief for Appellee-Cross  ppellant at 21-22). But not only is
Day the law in the Circuit, the basic approach followed has been
adopted by all the Courts of Appeals that have considered mixed
motivation in discrimination cases. See Richerson v. Jones, 551
F.2d 918, 923-925 (3d Cir. 1977); Patterson v. Greenwood School
District 50, 696 F.2d 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1982); Davis v. Board
of School Commissioners of Mobile County, 600 F.2d 470, 474 (5th
Cir. 1979); Caviale v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social
Services, 744 F.2d 1289, 1296 (7th Cir. 1984); Bibbs v. Block,
778 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc); Nanty v. Burrows Co.,
660 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981); Harbison v. Goldschmidt, 693
F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1982); Hill v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad
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Co., 767 F.2d 771, 775 (11th Cir. 1985).   Da  is also
consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of mixed motivation
in the constitutional setting. Mt. Healthy School District Board
of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1979). See also Brodin,
"The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action:
A Social Policy Perspective," 82 Columbia L. Rev. 292 (1982).
Given the district court's findings and the well established
law, the court properly required Price Waterhouse to prove that
Ann Hopkins would not have been hired in the absence of bias.
And the court rightly decided that the fir  had not met this
burden. Like its other findings on liability, this one is
shielded by Rule 52 and is, moreover, clearly correct.
Plaintiff was, after all, well qualified for partnership in
her own right. Price Waterhouse acknowledges this. She was
barred because some partners who did not know her well criticized
her interpersonal skills, and the lower court found that these
criticisms were tainted by discrimination. As adapted to the
employment decision process involved here. Da  v. Mathews entails
/ Within the broad consensus over Day are t o minor disagreements,
neither of which are material to this case. First, while most courts have
followed this Circuit in holding that an employer guilty of discrimination
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that the plaintiff  ould have
suffered the same fate absent bias, sane courts have held that a standard of
preponderance of the evidence is a propriate. See, e.g., Richerson, supra;
Bibbs, supra. In the present case. Price Waterhouse could not make the
requisite showing under either standard and has not suggested otherwise.
Second, the Eighth Circuit has held in Bibbs that a plaintiff who shows that
discrimination played a role in an employment decision is entitled to
declaratory relief and attorneys' fees, even if the e ployer meets the "but
for" test and proves that the same employment decision would have been  ade
even absent discrimination. It is not clear whether this is the law in this
Circuit, but it is immaterial here since Price Waterhouse did not meet the
"but for" test and so liability was clearly established.
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certain fair and reasonable infere at if the bias
were wrung out of these criticisms, there would have been fewer
negative com ents. Second, that those particular comments which
re ained negative would have been less vehement. Third, that the
net effect would have been that the Policy Committee would have
admitted plaintiff to membership in the firm. At the least, it
was defendant's burden to overcome the collective force of these
inferences by producing clear and convincing proof that the
result would have been the same.
Price Waterhouse did not begin to show that a candidate with
plaintiff's outstanding objective credentials would have been
rejected for partnership on the basis of muted concerns about
interpersonal s ills. On the contrary, the record reveals that
men were admitted in the face of serious concerns about their
personal characteristics.  / The court below apparently felt
that the similarities between plaintiff and these men were not
sufficiently parallel to permit a finding of disparate treatment
on the basis of such comparisons alone. But there plaintiff bore
the burden of proof; here defendant has it. And this comparative
evidence is sufficiently compelling so as to preclude defendant
from arguing   as it must to meet its burden under Day   that
candidates can be made partners only if no concerns are raised
about their "interpersonal skills." Price Waterhouse did not come
close to meeting its "but for" burden even by a preponderance of
the evidence, let alone under the "clear and convincing"
-i2/ See pp. 9-11, supra.
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certain fair and reasonable inferences: first, that if the bias
were wrung out of these criticisms, there would have been fewer
negative comments. Second, that those particular comments which
remained negative would have been less vehement. Third, that the
net effect would have been that the Policy Committee would have
admitted plaintiff to membership in the firm. At the least, it
was defendant's burden to overcome the collective force of these
inferences by producing clear and convincing proof that the
result would have been the same.
Price Waterhouse did not begin to show that a candidate with
plaintiff's outstanding objective credentials would have been
rejected for partnership on the basis of muted concerns about
interpersonal skills. On the contrary, the record reveals that
men were admitted in the face of serious concerns about their
personal characteristics.  / The court below apparently felt
that the similarities between plaintiff and these men were not
sufficiently parallel to permit a finding of disparate treatment
on the basis of such comparisons alone. But there plaintiff bore
the burden of proof; here defendant has it.  nd this comparative
evidence is sufficiently compelling so as to preclude defendant
from arguing   as it must to meet its burden under Day   that
candidates can be made partners only if no concerns are raised
about their "interpersonal skills." Price Waterhouse did not come
close to meeting its "but for" burden even by a preponderance of
the evidence, let alone under the "clear and convincing"
/ See pp. 9-11, supra.
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standard. Hence liability was established.
In Hishon v. Kin  & Spaldin   467 U.S. 69 (1984), the
Supreme Court ruled that decisions as to partnership admission
are covered by Title VII, and it is to be expected that most
denials of partnership will invol e group decisions and questions
of mixed motivation. If Hishon is to have any practical meaning,
issues of liability will have to be addressed much as the
district court did here. The court, after all, did no more than
apply familiar Title VII principles on liability to the facts of
this case.
. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL RELIEF
A victim of unlawful discrimination is presumptively
entitled to full relief. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975). This was not given here, and Price Waterhouse says
that this was proper because plaintiff voluntarily left the firm
and thus cut off her entitlement to relief. This argument
ignores both the facts of this case and the law on the
voluntariness of resignations.
A. Constructive Discharge
We observed in our original brief that it may not be
sensible to apply constructive discharge analysis to a case
involving denial of partnership, since it is to be expected that
a rejected candidate will leave a firm. In any event, plaintiff
has established constructive discharge here.
Price Waterhouse acknowledges, as it must, that the failure
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to admit a candidate to partnership in the context of a formal
"up or out" policy constitutes a per se involuntary termination
(Brief for Appellee-Cross Appellant at 50). But in that
circumstance the employee literally has no choice. Constructive
discharge addresses the situation in which the choice to stay or
go theoretically exists but in which the only reasonable option
is to leave. That was the case here.
When Ann Hopkins' office declined to renominate her for
partnership in the fall of 1983 after she had been placed on hold
the previous spring, she was told that it was "very unlikely"
that she would ever become a partner. 618 F.Supp. at 1113
(RE 12). The trial judge said that her chances were comparable
to waiting for lightning to strike. A senior partner, Donald
Epelbaum, told her to resign. Price Waterhouse tries to downplay
this but the advice, coming from one who opposed her candidacy,
confirmed that she had no realistic chance ever to become a
partner. Epelbaum's advice was also consistent with the normal
"up or out" practice at the firm. Defendant does not dispute
that nearly 95 per cent of the 122 partnership candidates turned
down in the period 1978-1983 left Price Waterhouse.   
The question of constructive discharge turns on whether
plaintiff had any reasonable option but to leave. Clark v.
Marsh, surpa; Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School
District. 644 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981). And this   as
defendant concedes   turns on whether she had a realistic chance
-i / Specifically, of the 122, only 9 remained.
-30-
of becoming a partner. Indeed, the fir 's repeated premise is
that plaintiff had a genuine opportunity to ma e partner and
that, fo  that reason, her decision to leave must be seen as
purely voluntary. Thus Price Waterhouse argues that "plaintiff
did not prove ... that resigning was her only reasonable option,
particularly if she still was genuinely interested in becoming a
partner at Price Waterhouse" (Brief for Appellee-Cross  ppellant
at 47-48; emphasis in original). This immediately follows the
argument that the "decision to place plaintiff on hold   could
not have compelled or justified plaintiff's departure, for
employees placed on hold typically were made partners eventually"
(Id. at 47).
But plaintiff was not just placed on hold. After that
happened, her office refused to renominate her. This was
extraordinary —— it does not appear to have occurred before at
Price Waterhouse —— and it meant that she woul  never become a
partner. Defendant's effort to focus solely on the initial hold
decision, without considerin  what finally happened to plaintiff,
is another example of the firm's attempt to "compartmentalize
he  proof in violation of the Supreme Court's instruction in
Continental Ore Co., supra. This also ignores the obvious impact
of the discriminatory hold decision on the later refusal to
renominate. Just two partners in plaintiff's office opposed her
renomination, and absolute unanimity was not required under fir 
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policy, -ii/ But given the nature of comments from outside her
office at the time of the hold decision, the office partners
believed that something approaching unanimity was required in her
case: "[w]ithout strong support within that office, it was felt
that her candidacy could not possibly be successful." 618 F.
Supp. at 1113 (RE 12). The point is that the hold decision and
the failure to renominate cannot be viewed in isolation. The
latter reinforced the former and meant that plaintiff's chances
for partnership at Price Waterhouse were over.
But defendant ignores this. In addition to the comments
quoted above, the firm elsewhere repeatedly argues that plaintiff
retained a real chance to become a partner. Thus the firm says
that the "decision to hold plaintiff in 1983 did not mean that
there would be any fewer partnerships at Price Waterhouse in the
future" (Brief for Appellee-Cross Appellant at 50). This
statement is true, but the implication   that partnership
opportunities would be available to plaintiff herself   most
assuredly is not. Yet Price Waterhouse keeps repeating the same
theme: "in the ordinary course she might have been made a partner
in a later round of elections" (Id. at 51); "[h]ad she remained
and demonstrated a continuing commitment to the firm, she might
have been able to change partners' perceptions of her
qualifications for partnership" (Id. at 52); "if she had chosen
to stay, she might have become a partner even before her lawsuit
See p. 12, supra, noting an instance in which a male St. Louis




It is qlear why defendant keeps insisting that plaintiff had
a genuine chance of becoming a partner. For if she had no such
opportunity, then her only reasonable option was to resign, and
constructive discharge is established. See Clar  v. Marsh,
supra; Pittman, supra. But plaintiff had no real chance to make
partner. The facts are clear on this, and so was the trial
judge:
They said you could stay and not be a
partner. You could stay and hope that
lightning would strike ... or you could quit.
Tr. 138.
The district court nevertheless declined to grant
prospective relief, apparently believing that constructive
discharge must be premised on a showing that an employer
intentionally forced an employee to resign. We showed in our
original brief that this is not the law (Original Brief for
Appellant-Cross  ppellee at 17). The court also observed that
plaintiff had not been subjected to humiliating treatment or
harassment. Certainly such factors may be used in establishing
constructive discharge, but they are not essential to it.
Instead the inquiry is "whether or not a reasonable person
in the employee's position and circumstances would have felt
compelled to resign." Pittman, supra, 644 F.2d at 1077. And
this depends on whether there are "aggravating factors" in
addition to the initial discrimination. Clark v.  arsh, supra,
665 F.2d at 1174. In the present case, the problem is not just
that Price Waterhouse refused to make Ann Hopkins a partner on
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one occasion. In addition, she was told that it was "very
unlikely" that she would ever be admitted and was advised to
resign by a key opponent. Thus her career was effectively
truncated, and her position was not materially different from one
who is subjected to a formal "up or out" policy   something that
defendant concedes is tantamount to an involuntary resignation.
The truncating of a career is an especially severe "aggravating
factor," and under Clark v. Marsh this results in constructive
discharge.
Clark was a civil service case, and promotions from grade to
grade within the government are qualitatively different from the
epochal move from manager to partner in a firm such as Price
Waterhouse. Nevertheless, Ms. Clark, who like plaintiff "did not
knowingly enter a discriminatory environment" and "reasonably
expected" that she would have opportunities for advancement, 665
F.2d at 1174, eventually was convinced by a series of events that
she had no change for meaningful career development: "Plaintiff
was thus essentially locked into a position from which she could
apparently obtain no relief." _Ij3. Hence it was reasonable for
her to leave her job.
With Ann Hopkins the message was delivered more quickly, but
its impact was every bit as clear: her opportunities for
professional growth at Price Waterhouse had ended. The very goal
that had brought and kept her at the firm could never be
realized. Defendant itself recognizes that such thwarting of a
career is an "aggravating factor" justifying resignation, or else
it would not have spent so many pages in a futile effort to show
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that plaintiff had a genuine opportunity to become a partner.
Price Waterhouse suggests that the issue of constructive
discharge is governed by the clearly erroneous rule. Here,
however, it appears that the district court's analysis was
legally flawed, e.g., by the belief that the employer must
intentionally seek to force the employee to resign or that the
employee must suffer humiliation or harassment. Given the proper
legal framework, the undisputed facts, including the trial
court's clear recognition that plaintiff had no meaningful chance
ever to achieve partnership at Price Waterhouse, establish that
the requirements for constructive discharge have been met.
B. Other Factors Bearing on Prospective Relief
Price Waterhouse argues in a long footnote that Federal
courts lack the power to order that a person be admitted to
partnership upon a finding of discrimination. 1$/ This is
nonsense. The Supreme Court ruled in Hishon v. King & Spalding
that partnership decisions such as this are covered by Title VII,
and Federal courts may resort to the entire arsenal of equitable
remedies to right statutory wrongs. See Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
We had said in our original brief that Title VII does not
"require a victim to choose between pursuing a career or_ seeking
complete vindication under the law." This had seemed an
unexceptional statement, but Price Waterhouse disputes it, citing
5/ Brief for Appellee-Cross Appellant at 52 n.34.
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Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (1982). Ford is not on
point. There the Supreme Court held that an employer can cut off
further liability for back pay by "unconditionally offering the
claimant the job previously denied," even though the offer does
not include retroactive seniority. _Iii* at 220. Ford would be
applicable here if, for example, defendant had offered to make
plaintiff a partner effective July 1985 (instead of July 1983),
and she had refused, insisting on credit for the two earlier
years. Of course, that is not what happened; plaintiff never
received an "unconditional offer" of the "job previously
denied." If she had, she would not be in this Court.
Finally, defendant also implies that plaintiff is insincere
about wanting to become a partner at Price Waterhouse, that she
is just trying to lay the predicate for an award of front pay.
There are two problems with this argument. First, plaintiff's
entire history with Price Waterhouse reveals her intense interest
in becoming a partner there. She joined because she was told she
would have a genuine opportunity to become a partner; she nearly
left early on when it appeared that the firm was reneging on this
commitment; she stayed and produced more business than any of the
87 male partnership candidates nominated along with her; and she
left only when it became apparent that she had no chance of
becoming a partner. Second, more important, plaintiff cannot
control whether she gets front pay in lieu of admission to the
partnership. This is committed to the discretion of the district
court, and partnership is the preferred alternative. Front pay
is awarded only if the court believes that reinstatement is
inappropriate, perhaps because of animosity caused by the
litigation. See Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724,
728 (2d Cir. 1984).
Our point about front pay is not that it is required.
Rather, given both the finding of discrimination and the death
knell to plaintiff's chances for partnership, some form of
prospecti e relief is mandated.
C. Back Pay
e have little to add to our previous discussion of back
pay, except to note that the Fifth Circuit, in recently remanding
a back pay determination for more detailed findings, has observed
that "[t]he inadequate record may be explained by the
misapprehension of the parties that they were trying only the
liability issue and that damages were to be tried later."
Sellers v. Delgado College, 781 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1986).
There is no suggestion that this "misapprehension" should operate
to deprive the plaintiff of relief. Here there was no
misapprehension at all; Price Waterhouse was in full accord with
the need to focus trial on the issue of liability, and it is
somewhat disappointing to see the firm backing and filling on
this point now.
CONCLUSION
Ann Hopkins is a talented and competent professional. The
district court found that she was denied partnership at Price
Waterhouse because of her sex, and that finding is amply
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supported by the record. If anything, the court was kind to the
firm. Having proved discrimination, plaintiff was entitled to
full equitable relief. Her resignation does not bar such relief,
since it was the only reasonable response to the firm's action in
foreclosing the very career opportunities that had brought her
there and  ept her there.
We ask that the district court's finding of liability be
affirmed, that the court's ruling as to remedy be vacated, and
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